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It is also obliged under the act to ensure 
that ‘all significant assumptions underlying 
any projections’ are included in the 
statement. Aside from these parameters, 
the act is silent on the matters to be 
covered, giving the Treasury considerable 
flexibility over the process employed to 
produce such documents, including the 
nature and extent of any consultation 
with external experts, the wider policy 
community and interested stakeholders.
Since the requirement for such statements 
was introduced in 2004 the Treasury 
has published three reports. The most 
recent of these – Affording Our Future 
– was released in July 2013. Against this 
backdrop, this article considers:
• the nature of long-term fiscal 
planning;
• why long-term fiscal planning is 
important;
• why a legislative requirement for 
such planning is desirable;
• whether long-term fiscal planning 
actually achieves its goals;
• some of the uncertainties involved in 
long-term fiscal planning; and
• the potential for long-term planning 
in areas beyond fiscal ones.
The Role and Importance of 
Long-Term Fiscal  
Planning
Many countries now require the regular publication of long-
term fiscal projections, looking at the potential long-term 
costs of government spending programmes (see Anderson 
and Sheppard, 2009). In New Zealand, section 26N of the 
Public Finance Act 1989 (as amended in 2004) requires 
the Treasury to publish a Statement on the Long-Term 
Fiscal Position at least every four years. Under the act, such 
statements must look out at least 40 years.1 Their contents are 
the responsibility of the secretary to the Treasury (rather than 
the minister of finance), and the Treasury is required to use 
‘its best professional judgments’ in assessing the fiscal outlook 
and potential risks. 
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What is long-term fiscal planning?
This article uses the expression ‘long-term 
fiscal planning’ as a general term to refer 
to the Statements on the Long-Term Fiscal 
Position that the New Zealand Treasury 
publishes as well as similar reporting 
requirements in other jurisdictions. 
‘Planning’ is a word that can mean dif-
ferent things in different contexts, of 
course. Perhaps most commonly, it 
tends to imply a clearly sought outcome 
along with steps to get there. However, 
we use ‘planning’ in a looser sense here. 
Hence, long-term fiscal planning includes 
projecting what the future might hold given 
a number of reasonable assumptions; it is 
not restricted to mapping out what steps 
might be necessary to reach a particular 
outcome.
Long-term fiscal planning attempts 
to get a sense of possible future demands 
on government resources. It involves 
looking at current spending programmes 
and assessing their potential future 
costs. The methodology for the New 
Zealand Treasury’s production of regular 
Statements on the Long-Term Fiscal 
Position involves assuming that current 
legislative and policy settings will remain 
the same and that historic per capita 
growth rates in different spending areas 
(both operating and capital) will continue. 
These assumptions are combined with 
other assumptions about likely future 
demand for different government 
spending areas in the future. Factors 
like the performance of the economy 
and the age structure of the population 
affect that future demand. Together, 
these assumptions give a picture of how 
different spending areas might grow or 
shrink in the future if current policy 
settings do not change. Additionally, they 
provide guidance on projected trends in 
aggregate levels of public expenditure.
The Treasury also includes assumptions 
about revenue, assuming a relatively 
constant revenue stream (as a share of 
GDP), based on average historic tax takes 
relative to GDP. The combination of ‘no 
policy change’ scenarios on both the 
spending and revenue side give a sense of 
whether, and the extent to which, current 
policy settings on either the spending 
or revenue side (or both) may need to 
change in the future to avoid a funding 
gap.
In New Zealand there is no explicit 
requirement for the government to respond 
to the Treasury’s regular Statements on 
the Long-Term Fiscal Position. In practice, 
however, governments do tend to respond 
in some fashion. For example, Bill 
English, the current minister of finance, 
released a press statement in response to 
the Treasury’s 2013 statement (English, 
2013). More formally, it has become 
practice for the Fiscal Strategy Report, 
the government’s primary document for 
communicating the details of its fiscal 
strategy,2 to contain a section addressing 
long-term fiscal pressures as described in 
the most recent Statement on the Long-
Term Fiscal Position. These sections help 
readers marry the outlook for the next 
40+ years with the more medium-term 
focus of Fiscal Strategy Reports.
As noted above, alluding to the 
Treasury’s long-term fiscal projections in 
Fiscal Strategy Reports is not mandatory. 
But a recent addition to the fiscal 
responsibility principles in part 2 of the 
Public Finance Act ought to reinforce 
the practice. The Public Finance (Fiscal 
Responsibility) Amendment Act 2013 
introduced a new principle of responsible 
fiscal management that governments 
should, when formulating fiscal strategy, 
‘consider its likely impacts on present and 
future generations’. The aim of the new 
principle is to ensure that governments 
consider the long-term implications of 
their fiscal policies and explain those 
implications.
Why is long-term fiscal planning important?
Long-term fiscal planning often reveals 
that the long-term costs of some 
government spending programmes are 
quite different – often more expensive3 – 
from their short-term costs. A programme 
that might have been relatively cheap 
when it was introduced can have features 
that mean its costs increase over time. A 
programme that becomes more expensive 
in the future implies that other spending 
areas will need to be squeezed or more 
revenue will need to be raised if the 
programme is to continue. Increasing 
revenue or squeezing other spending 
areas might not reflect the preferences of 
the electorate. In that case, changes will be 
necessary to alter the long-term trajectory 
of the programme at issue.
In a sense, simply the fact that 
changes to a programme will eventually 
be necessary is not a reason for long-
term planning. After all, changes can be 
made when they become necessary and 
not before. But often the kinds of policy 
changes necessary will require some 
lead time to give people time to plan for 
possible new arrangements. In addition, 
a government that acknowledges that 
changes will be needed sends a signal 
to lenders, households, and firms that it 
can be trusted to address fiscal pressures 
appropriately, giving people confidence 
in that government’s future solvency. And 
changes that are planned well in advance 
and follow an informed public debate 
tend to be less disruptive – and less prone 
to reversal later – than sudden changes.
The desirability of long-term planning 
is particularly clear in the case of state 
pensions. The Treasury’s 2013 Statement 
on the Long-Term Fiscal Position 
projects that if current policy settings 
remain the same, the government will go 
from spending just over 4% of GDP on 
New Zealand Superannuation in 2010 to 
about 8% of GDP in 2060.4 It does not 
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advance and follow an informed public 
debate tend to be less disruptive – and 
less prone to reversal later – than sudden 
changes.
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necessarily follow that we should expect 
to see policy changes – after all, many 
OECD countries already spend more 
than 8% of GDP on state pensions.5 But 
assuming that changes to New Zealand 
Superannuation policy were deemed 
to be desirable, governments should 
introduce reforms slowly and after an 
informed public debate.6 People rely 
on having a more or less certain stream 
of income when they decide to stop 
working and make decisions about how 
much to save over the course of their 
working lives based on that reliance. Any 
changes to New Zealand Superannuation, 
therefore, would need to be signalled well 
in advance of actually coming into effect. 
Long-term fiscal planning also allows 
time to build consensus around what 
kinds of changes are best, leading to less 
likelihood of policy reversals.
In relation to public health care, the 
other main area in which the Treasury’s 
long-term fiscal projections show 
significant pressures,7 the benefits of 
early warning are less cut and dried. 
Even if we decide as a society that the 
increases in public health care spending 
the Treasury projects are undesirable, 
it is not immediately obvious what we 
might do to avoid them. There are some 
possibilities, like increasing the use of 
patient co-payments and limiting the 
coverage of the public system, as well 
as trying to find more efficiencies, but 
the fiscal impacts of these options are 
difficult to quantify.8 And the impacts 
that such changes might have on any one 
individual’s circumstances are impossible 
to know in advance. Having said that, an 
understanding of what the public health 
system is likely to look like in the future 
could well affect people’s short-term 
decisions, such as whether to buy health 
insurance.
While their role of helping individuals 
plan for the future is more limited, 
projections for future health care 
spending serve the important task of 
putting current and future governments 
on notice that policy changes will be 
necessary if they do not want to see 
public health care spending growing 
significantly as a share of the economy. 
Of course, some governments may 
see proportionately higher health care 
expenditure as desirable, at least relative 
to the alternatives. But in that case they 
will need to make trade-offs elsewhere, 
either by accepting higher taxes or 
by reprioritising within the existing 
fiscal pool. If the public is reasonably 
well-informed about long-term fiscal 
pressures, it ought to be easier to judge 
and debate what sorts of trade-offs might 
accord best with society’s preferences.
Why is a legislative requirement for long-
term fiscal planning considered desirable?
While New Zealand’s requirement for the 
regular production of a Statement on the 
Long-Term Fiscal Position was introduced 
in a 2004 amendment to the Public Finance 
Act, the New Zealand Treasury has in fact 
had a model capable of producing long-
term fiscal projections since well before 
2004, and from time to time either the 
Treasury or the government has published 
such projections (for example, Janssen, 
2002). A legislative requirement is useful, 
however, for making sure that long-term 
fiscal planning actually happens. Politics 
and policy analysis are often taken up 
with urgent issues, leaving little time 
or resources for long-term thinking. 
Despite the usefulness and importance 
of long-term planning, time and resource 
constraints can mean that it will not 
necessarily happen.
Furthermore, governments might have 
incentives to avoid confronting the issues 
that long-term planning uncovers. In 
the context of long-term fiscal planning, 
often the planning process reveals that 
certain government spending areas are 
likely to become more expensive in the 
future. Governments can then come 
under pressure to say what they intend to 
do about these rising costs – an issue that 
governments might prefer to avoid. 
A legislative requirement to carry out 
long-term fiscal planning on a regular 
basis both makes sure that work happens 
even when there are more immediately 
pressing issues and also removes the 
temptation to prevent publication 
for reasons of political convenience. 
Accordingly, it provides for greater 
certainty and is likely to increase the 
overall quality of public debate.
Does long-term fiscal planning work?
A core assumption underpinning long-
term fiscal planning is that if the facts 
about possible future trajectories are 
known, people will make short-term 
decisions that ought to lead to better 
long-term outcomes. But this rationale 
encounters some practical problems 
and is open to a number of objections. 
The most significant problem is that the 
people responsible for making short-
term decisions are often not those who 
will eventually experience the long-term 
outcomes of those decisions, e.g. 20–40 
years later. Taking the interests of people 
in the future into account often involves 
some cost to voters now. Even with better 
information, voters do not necessarily 
have incentives to support measures that 
they perceive to be against their own 
interests. 
This problem has been described as 
a political asymmetry – an imbalance of 
political power between political actors.9 
There are different kinds of political 
asymmetry. For instance, a voting 
A core assumption underpinning long-
term fiscal planning is that if the facts 
about possible future trajectories are 
known, people will make short-term 
decisions that ought to lead to better 
long-term outcomes.
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asymmetry is essentially the fact that 
young people and people not yet born 
cannot vote, so their views are not directly 
taken into account in a democracy, yet 
such people will be directly affected 
in various ways by the choices of those 
who are currently able to vote and make 
decisions on public policy matters. In 
many situations a cost-benefit asymmetry 
may also be in evidence – namely, the fact 
that the costs and benefits of different 
policies may fall on different groups 
(and/or over different time periods).10 
Together, these asymmetries have obvious 
implications for long-term fiscal policy. 
Superannuation policy is a particularly 
good example. In New Zealand, current 
superannuation payments to those aged 
65 and over are funded by the current 
cohort of taxpayers: that is, the people 
who receive superannuation payments 
are by and large a different group of 
people from the group who pays for 
them. (There is some overlap, of course, 
as many over-65s pay significant amounts 
of tax.) And any adjustments to New 
Zealand Superannuation realistically 
(if not legally) have to be made well in 
advance, meaning that a cohort of people 
must vote to reduce what will eventually 
be their own entitlements, without 
necessarily any offsetting personal gain. 
The projected age profile of voters in 
New Zealand out to 2050 (see Figure 
1) gives little comfort in this regard. 
Simon Upton’s and Michael Cullen’s 
contributions to this issue of Policy 
Quarterly also make this point.
The case of New Zealand 
Superannuation can be extended to 
long-term fiscal planning more generally. 
‘Doing something’ about long-term fiscal 
pressures might involve asking a group 
of voters to accept some cost – perhaps 
not a huge cost, but still one that people 
will notice – for a future gain which may 
largely be enjoyed by others. We can draw 
an analogy with climate change mitigation 
policies: initiatives to reduce the likely 
magnitude and impacts of human-
induced climate change tend to require 
sacrifices on the part of current voters, 
with the benefits (in the form of reducing 
ecological damage and lower adaptation 
costs) being felt by future generations. In 
such contexts there is legitimate room for 
scepticism about the extent to which just 
providing information can be effective. 
Indeed, with respect to climate change, 
the international evidence thus far is that 
very few governments have been willing 
to impose significant short- to medium-
term costs – via some kind of market-
based instrument (e.g. an emissions 
tax or an emissions trading scheme) 
– on current voters in order to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
However, in the area of long-term 
fiscal planning, the problems of political 
asymmetry might be over-stated. The 
time horizon over which countries 
carry out long-term fiscal planning is 
actually not that long: it is 40 years in 
New Zealand, and most other countries 
take comparable time periods. Many of 
the people who will bear the cost of any 
short-sighted decisions made in the near 
term are already both alive and voting. 
The current cohort of people aged 18–30 
is aware of long-term fiscal issues and is 
making its views felt: Susie Krieble and 
Finn O’Dwyer-Cunliffe’s article in this 
Policy Quarterly issue is an example. Even 
voters who are unlikely to be significant 
taxpayers in 40 years’ time still have 
reasons to care about those who will be 
large taxpayers in future decades. Voting 
now for policies that, for example, imply 
much higher taxes for future taxpayers 
is risky. Future taxpayers are likely to 
have many options other than living in 
New Zealand, so there is no guarantee 
that such people will stay and keep 
paying taxes they perceive to be unfair. 
A New Zealand that loses a chunk of its 
workforce will be unable to maintain high 
transfer payments, regardless of whether 
a large proportion of the electorate would 
vote for them. Thus, even a very narrow-
minded voter who cares only about what 
he or she personally pays to and receives 
from the government should consider the 
impacts the policies they favour might 
have on others. 
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
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55-64
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18-24
Figure 1: Projected New Zealand elector count by age group (% of total)
Source: Treasury (2013), using data from Nolan et al (2012)
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Furthermore, the picture of a narrow-
minded voter who cares only about what 
he or she personally pays to, and receives 
from, the government is, in our view, an 
overly pessimistic representation of most 
people. Most people care about people 
other than themselves – they care about 
their children and grandchildren, for 
example. There are also many instances 
in history of societies making decisions 
that seem to go against the short-term 
interests of most people in those societies. 
Colin James, in his paper to the Affording 
Our Future conference, gave the examples 
of the abolition of the slave trade, and the 
British Reform Act of 1832 widening the 
franchise (James, 2012). The point is that 
with enough information, people can 
and do make what seems to them to be 
the right decision even when it appears to 
be contrary to their own interests.
That is essentially the rationale 
behind the publication of long-term fiscal 
planning documents. Simply providing 
information does not force anyone to 
do anything about what the information 
reveals. But providing information gives 
people the opportunity to consider what 
problems are on the horizon, what policy 
options are available to address these 
problems, and what the long-term impact 
of their choices could be.
Is long-term fiscal planning accurate enough 
to be useful?
Long-term fiscal planning can be criticised 
on the basis that the time horizons it 
involves – four decades in New Zealand’s 
case – are too long for it to produce any 
useful information. After all, consider how 
many unexpected things have happened 
over the last 40 years, and how much they 
have changed the course of our lives. Given 
the inherent unknowability of the future, 
can long-term fiscal planning really say 
anything useful about what might happen 
over the next 40 years?
This critique, however, misunder-
stands the purpose of long-term fiscal 
planning. Such planning does not 
attempt to predict the future, but rather 
aims to show the likely long-term fiscal 
implications if current trends continue. 
The fact that policy settings might 
change, so that those projections do not 
eventuate, is explicitly taken into account. 
In fact, to some extent that is the whole 
point of such planning.
Having said that, in the process of 
projecting the potential future fiscal 
impacts of current policies, long-term 
fiscal planners need to make some 
predictions about what might happen in 
the future.11 In the case of the potential 
future path of spending on public health 
care and New Zealand Superannuation, 
modellers need to incorporate predictions 
about factors that affect demand for 
that spending. Here is one place where 
uncertainty creeps in.
Projecting future demand for New 
Zealand Superannuation, assuming 
current policy settings, is relatively 
mechanical: it is driven by the number 
of people aged 65 and over in each year 
between now and 2053 (although the 
Treasury’s projections actually go out to 
2060). All of the people who will be 65 
or over between now and 2053 are already 
alive. Certainly, some of those people will 
die before the end of that period, and we 
do not know exactly how many, but we 
have a pretty good idea of the general 
range.
Projecting the future costs of public 
health care involves more uncertainty. 
The Treasury’s projections of the possible 
fiscal path of public health care rely 
heavily on the rate at which spending on 
public health care has grown in the past. 
The future might be quite different from 
the past. Technological changes might 
make it easier to treat more people more 
cheaply; alternatively, some new forms of 
health treatment might be very expensive, 
and/or medical conditions such as obesity 
may become more common across the 
population, thus generating significant 
additional demand for health services. 
The difficulties in projecting future 
public health care spending are a specific 
example of a more general difficulty: that 
is, there are many things that might affect 
future demand for spending, whether on 
education, welfare, law and order or other 
areas, that we simply cannot predict. Thus 
the Treasury’s projections have significant 
uncertainty bands around them. 
Should we be better at long-term planning in 
areas beyond the fiscal?
Most of the arguments in favour of long-
term fiscal planning apply equally well to 
long-term planning in general. We might 
not be very good at predicting the future 
accurately, but by thinking about what it 
might bring we give ourselves options. But 
whereas long-term fiscal planning in New 
Zealand is relatively well-established with 
the legislative requirement for the Treasury 
to produce Statements on the Long-Term 
Fiscal Position, long-term planning in 
other areas is more piecemeal. 
Two areas where better long-term 
planning might be useful in New Zealand 
are social trends and environmental 
trends. Neither kind of long-term planning 
would be exactly like long-term fiscal 
planning, but they could be beneficial 
all the same. Long-term social planning 
might look at current social trends and 
their likely future impact, assessing how 
the future role of the government might 
need to change in order to respond to 
them. Long-term environmental planning 
could look at a range of possible long-
term environmental outcomes, some 
of which might depend on actions we 
take now. Long-term thinking in these 
areas is admittedly challenging, and 
risks being wrong, but it is possible. The 
OECD, for example, recently published 
... long-term fiscal planning in New 
Zealand is relatively well-established 
with the legislative requirement for the 
Treasury ... long-term planning in other 
areas is more piecemeal.
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its Environmental Outlook to 2050, which 
looks at key social, demographic and 
economic trends and what these are likely 
to mean for the natural environment 
(OECD, 2011).
It is arguable that recent changes to the 
State Sector Act 1988 nudge government 
departments towards taking a more long-
term view. Departmental chief executives 
are now responsible for ‘the stewardship 
of a department ... including its long-
term sustainability, organisational health, 
capability, and capacity to offer free and 
frank advice to successive governments’ 
(section 32(1)(d)). ‘Stewardship’ is defined 
as ‘active planning and management 
of medium- and long-term interests, 
along with associated advice’ (section 
2). The introduction of the notion of 
‘stewardship’ recognises that while 
government departments must act 
primarily in accordance with the wishes 
of the government of the day, they also 
have broader responsibilities to the 
country more generally, both now and 
in the future. Making sure that they are 
ready to address the issues of tomorrow 
as well as today is part of that broader 
role.
Giving effect to these new stewardship 
requirements will probably require 
changes to current practice. As Iain 
Rennie, the state services commissioner, 
has pointed out, departments are ‘very 
good at responding to the demands of 
ministers and the here and now’ but 
‘much less good at thinking about the 
long term and the various dimensions of 
that’ (Rennie, 2013). Thinking about long-
term issues does not necessarily require 
formal or regular reporting, but examples 
from other countries or multinational 
organisations can give some guidance 
about how to give effect to a stewardship 
culture.12
Conclusion 
Looking at long-term fiscal issues is a 
well-established practice in New Zealand. 
Long-term fiscal planning gives us 
warning about what kind of spending 
pressures might be on the horizon and 
what we might do about them. Admittedly, 
‘doing something’ about future spending 
pressures must confront a political 
asymmetry problem, as the people 
making the decisions are not necessarily 
the same as those who will feel the effects 
of those decisions. But there is reason to 
hope that long-term fiscal planning can 
still be effective. An emerging opportunity 
for New Zealand will be incorporating the 
broad techniques employed for long-term 
fiscal planning into thinking about the 
future more generally.
1 The expression ‘long-term’ can have a number of different 
meanings. Forty years makes sense in the context of the 
Statement on the Long-Term Fiscal Position, being a long 
enough time period to get a sense of potential future costs 
of different programmes, but not so long as to make any 
projections meaningless. Even within the Public Finance 
Act, ‘long-term’ has different definitions, reflecting different 
purposes. For example, section 26J requires governments to 
set out their ‘long-term fiscal objectives’ in the annual Fiscal 
Strategy Report, where ‘long-term’ means at least ten years.
2 The government publishes a Fiscal Strategy Report along 
with each Budget. Fiscal Strategy Reports are required by 
section 26J of the Public Finance Act 1989.
3 It is not the case that all spending programmes become more 
expensive over time, however. For example, as discussed in 
Paul Sherrell’s contribution to this issue of Policy Quarterly, 
current projections show expenditure in the justice sector 
declining as a share of GDP if current trends continue.
4 This number is simply gross New Zealand Superannuation 
payments; it does not include KiwiSaver contributions from 
the government and does not net off the tax people pay on 
New Zealand Superannuation payments.
5 For example, the Euro area average was around 10% of GDP 
in 2010 (Upton, 2012). 
6 Nicola Kirkup’s contribution to this Policy Quarterly issue 
describes and assesses some potential changes to pension 
policy.
7 Treasury’s 2013 Statement on the Long-Term Fiscal Position 
projects public health care spending to grow from 6.8% of 
GDP in 2010 to 10.8% (approximately) in 2060.
8 Mays et al., 2013, in this Policy Quarterly issue, elaborate 
on the difficulties of predicting the actual impacts of ‘cost 
saving’ public health care measures. For example, increasing 
the use of co-payments could discourage people from seeking 
certain kinds of care, meaning that they need more expensive 
care later as their health deteriorates.
9 The concept of political asymmetry is explained in Boston 
and Lempp (2011).
10 The voting and cost-benefit asymmetries are two of four 
democratic asymmetries identified by Wolf (1987). The other 
two are the interest group asymmetry and the accounting 
asymmetry.
11 A ‘prediction’ or ‘forecast’ is the forecaster’s best guess about 
what will probably happen over a particular time period. 
While forecasters are aware that reality will probably be 
somewhat different from their forecasts, and maybe wildly 
different, a forecast is still intended to be a prediction of 
what will actually happen, given what we know now. In 
contrast, a projection merely states what would happen if 
certain assumptions turn out to be true. A projection need 
not bear any close resemblance to what actually unfolds and 
it is not a criticism of a projection that it turned out to be 
‘wrong’ (whereas a forecast could be criticised on that basis).
12 The controller and auditor-general currently has a work 
programme that involves helping the public sector plan 
for New Zealand’s future needs, with particular reference 
to a changing demographic structure but also taking into 
account other ways in which the future might be different 
from the present. So far the auditor-general has produced 
three reports as part of this work programme: Commentary 
on Affording Our Future: Statement on the Long-Term Fiscal 
Position, Public Sector Financial Sustainability and Matters 
arising from the 2012-2022 Local Authority Long-Term 
Plans. These reports are available at www.oag.govt.nz. 
Further publications are planned for 2013.
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